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Reflections on Secularism and Religion 
from the Bosphorus1
Paula M. Cooey
Musing
My first full day in Istanbul I wake up around 4:00 a.m. to barking dogs 
and men engaged in heated discussion in another language. The most striking 
feature is the noise. Birds compete with barking dogs and what I guess to be 
security guards making their rounds on the campus of Bogazici University, 
where a multitude of yowling cats roam freely. I try to meditate by incorpo-
rating the sounds but to no avail. Then from a distance I hear the muezzins’ 
first call to prayer. (I learn later that the ones I hear most clearly call from the 
mosque up the hill across from the main entrance to the campus and from the 
Artakoy mosque, farther south, but still within walking distance.) Almost 
simultaneously cargo ships start blasting their horns as they move along the 
water, their engines droning as they temporarily drown out the muezzins. 
Boats and chanters seem to fight it out over which sounds will endure. The 
muezzins get the last word, then fall silent as the birds pick up again in even 
greater numbers. By now it is 5:00 a.m. and the sky begins to lighten.
Maybe competition is the wrong metaphor—one that speaks to my own 
location as a U.S. outsider whose ethos is Christian, whose economic practices 
are capitalist, whose country claims individualism as its core. Perhaps this 
cluster of noises that confronts me can ultimately produce a harmony. Cer-
tainly this is what the Turks themselves seek. Coming from a history of grand 
experiments in such directions, experiments that at best never quite succeed 
and at worst fail dramatically, I am suspicious but hopeful as well.
The view from my room is extraordinary—a corner room in a faculty guest 
house, set high on a hill that catches a curve in the Bosphorus bending from 
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the south to the west. The large double western windows look out onto a court-
yard marked by forest on one side and the Bosphoros on the other. Farther west 
looms one of several suspension bridges linking “Europe” to “Asia,” “West” 
to “East.” Over time these boundaries will blur in virtually every respect. My 
southern window, to the left of my desk, opens onto more water, more “Asia” 
across the way. Looking out and down over the hill from this vantage, I see the 
ruins of a fortress. Each day greets me with such sounds and sights and ever 
new ones as well—a recorder, an accordion with base and drums, all playing 
unfamiliar tunes outside my window; the arabesque music played by taxi 
drivers; the taped music of Sinatra, the Beatles, and Elvis emanating from the 
guest house for celebratory occasions; a flutist playing Bach. A cellular phone 
rings as gulls squawk above me.
It is vividly clear to me from the readings, the sights, and, most of all, the 
sounds of Istanbul that human lives and interactions vastly exceed and chal-
lenge such binaries as secularism and religion and their associated analytical 
categories of “West” and “East,” “Europe” and “Asia.” It is much harder to 
capture motion and rhythms than to portray a single image, which is perhaps 
why it is important to be suspicious of images as idolatrous—a legacy of 
monotheism shared by Jew, Christian, Muslim, and Marxist alike—a theo-
logical version of anti-essentialism. And the word, the spoken image so central 
to debate, simultaneously manifests and denies its own ambiguous instantia-
tions in the face of silence and the empty page. To me, the multiple sights and 
sounds of a place suggest richness and texture, the complexities of human liv-
ing as it defies the categories by which we seek to analyze it. So it is with the 
sights and sounds of Istanbul.
Analysis2
One example will suffice. The contrapuntal relation between the Mus-
lim headscarf (basortu) and proliferating icons of Ataturk, exhibited in 
both public and private space, register ongoing, high-pitched debate 
among the Turks over their future as a nation. This contrapuntal rela-
tion provides one way to grasp the complexity of how the secular and 
the religious produce each other, even as their categorical usefulness 
dissolves in the process of production.3 When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
secularized Turkey in the early twentieth century, he sought to equal-
ize the status of men and women in an effort to “Westernize” Tur-
key. His government granted women the vote, and he appointed elite 
women to judicial and political office in large numbers. Elite women 
also achieved more education. Just as Ataturk insisted that men wear 
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European hats, he forbade by law the wearing of the headscarf in 
government space, including government offices of any kind and the 
public schools. The public schools included the universities as well as 
elementary and secondary education. Such was Turkish secularity or 
Kemalism in its origins.
Over the course of the last eighty years or so this prohibition has 
generated conflict fraught with irony. For example, observant Muslim 
women, if they seek to fulfill what they understand to be a requirement 
of Sharia, or Muslim law, are excluded from educational institutions, 
from work as civil servants, and from participation in political life.4 It 
is important to grasp here that this is not an issue of personal choice as 
it would be with the wearing of Christian symbols like the cross; rather 
it is a matter of religious obligation. This exclusion has not only under-
mined Ataturk’s attempt at egalitarianism (an attempt now disputed 
by some Turkish feminists), it has radicalized secular women, produc-
ing an alliance of secular with observant women. Secular women have 
increasingly chosen to wear the headscarf in protest against the law in 
solidarity with observant women. Wearing the headscarf by choice has 
come to symbolize secular resistance to statism. Secularity thus under-
goes an ironic modification.5
As a further irony, merchants have quite literally capitalized on this 
political movement.6 A whole fashion industry has evolved to meet the 
needs of elite observant Muslim women. “Muslim chic” is making its 
mark in Turkey through tesstür, an elaborate ensemble that involves 
not only expanding the size of the headscarf, but developing a stylish, 
long-sleeved, long, wide coat (pardesu). Tekbir, Inc., a recently formed 
design house, like its counterparts in Paris and New York, exhibits 
models walking the catwalk, displaying lovely variations on “cover-
ing.” Such displays ironically push the margin on traditional Muslim 
teaching on feminine modesty. Sharia requires none of this garb spe-
cifically, though the ensemble provides a modest, tasteful alternative 
to what a growing middle class of practicing Muslims view as Western 
fashion excesses. Thus, in response to secular law, Islam itself under-
goes a transmutation as further modified by free-market capitalism.
Just as more women, secular as well as observant, have appeared 
publicly more often in the headscarf, images of Ataturk have prolif-
erated. Images of Ataturk have always appeared on the Turkish Lira 
and as objects of patriotic veneration in private homes, as paintings 
and photographs on the walls of public buildings, and as sculptures in 
public places (much like sculptures of George Washington or Abraham 
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Lincoln in this country). Now, however, such images appear in bars, in 
taxicabs, on clothing, baked into dishware, as tie tacks, on ties them-
selves—everywhere. According to one scholar, Ataturk’s iconographic 
omnipresence constitutes a Kemalist response to the debates surround-
ing Turkey’s future as a secular state that is predominantly Muslim.7
Just as tesstür exemplifies an internalized orientalism, so images of 
Ataturk represent both nationalist and tourist secularist kitsch. Their 
shared fetishizing and commodification notwithstanding, posed in 
relation to each other, the headscarf and the images of Ataturk exem-
plify a profound ongoing debate over Turkey’s future, one that is in the 
process of redefining both secularity and religiosity.
To me as an outsider, the issue is one of law. One could look at the 
situation in an oversimplified manner as a contest between secular or 
Kemalist law and conservative interpretations of Sharia. Looked at this 
way, the question is one of whether state or religious authority will 
reign.
Much depends, however, on how one defines secularism. Laïcité, the 
French model for secularism, maintains religious neutrality by pro-
hibiting religious expression in public space altogether. By contrast, 
the United States Constitution not only prohibits the establishment of 
a state religion, which includes some restriction on public displays of 
religion, but it simultaneously upholds free expression of religion—a 
positive accommodation within certain limitations, defined often by 
the judiciary, case by case. If one assumes laïcité as the model for secu-
larism, and the Turkish state has historically made this assumption, 
then it follows that for the state to lift the ban on the headscarf is for the 
state to concede to religious authority. If one assumes the protection 
of religious expression as an individual right, in other words, if one 
were to adopt the U.S. model of secularism, then for the state to lift the 
ban, while an accommodation of sorts, is still for the state ultimately to 
define what constitutes both secularity and religiosity. Given that the 
state is claiming this authority and defining it in terms of individual 
rights (related to, but not to be confused with individual choice), it is 
redefining religion away from more communal goods toward more 
individual choices. From the state’s perspective, individuals may 
express themselves religiously as they choose; from the adherent’s per-
spective, she may now perform a duty about which she has no choice 
in public space. Whether one assumes laïcité or a U.S. model, religion 
in the hands of the secular state undergoes privatization and with this 
comes a relative trivialization of religious duty as if it were merely a 
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choice permitted at the behest of the state. The chief difference is that 
religion’s public profession, albeit trivialized, is no longer altogether 
prohibited under the U.S. model.
The Turks, under the present regime, seem to be moving slowly 
away from laïcité toward a U.S. model. There are past precedents for 
accommodation, as when the use of Arabic in the call to prayers, once 
prohibited by Ataturk, was later reinstated. All the same, many Kemal-
ists are not altogether happy about such accommodations. Kemalists 
largely view with suspicion the present majority party, the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP). They see AKP as an Islamist party, a view 
about which the AKP exhibits a certain ambivalence.
Making contact with Islamist scholars was virtually impossible. With 
one exception, my Kemalist colleagues tended not to take Islamists 
seriously as scholars. Fatma Muge Gocek, Professor of Sociology at the 
University of Michigan, made every effort to help me get in touch with 
Islamist scholars through e-mail. Our combined efforts failed, I am told, 
because Turks often do not respond readily to e-mails. Meanwhile, the 
Kemalists on the whole showed little if any inclination to establish col-
legial relations with Islamists. Contact came instead through political 
channels, thanks to the good will and efforts of one of our alumnae, 
Anne Seasholes-Kozlu, who arranged a dinner meeting with Orhan 
Çelebi and his wife Zeynep.8 Çelebi, an AKP member of Parliament 
and one of the chief advisors to Prime Minister Erdogan, met with 
Nadya Nedelsky, my colleague in International Studies, as well as oth-
ers of us. The Çelebi family submitted to roughly three hours of our 
questions, some of which we had circulated to them through Anne in 
advance. MP and Mrs. Çelebi gave me my only first-hand look at the 
impact of secularism on Islam in Turkey.
Orhan Çelebi proved to be the insider’s insider, the consummate 
entrepreneur turned politician. Educated in the United States like his 
wife Zeynep (who is an aide to the Prime Minister’s wife), he was artic-
ulate and filled with enthusiasm. He stressed over and over the plural-
ism within the AKP, of which the Çelebis were living proof. He and his 
wife were religiously non-observant. She, like her husband, dressed in 
contemporary Western style. Both of them drank alcohol. Neither of 
them prayed five times daily. They would be flying the next week to 
Boston to attend their son’s graduation from Harvard.
MP Çelebi waxed at length on his commitment to individualism, a 
free-market economy, moral incorruptibility, human rights, and admis-
sion to the European Union. Though she on occasion deferred to him, 
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Mrs. Çelebi often prompted him and offered her own, less campaign-
oriented, more thoughtful responses. Both were utterly charming and 
filled with good humor. Both stressed how they regard religious belief 
and observance as a private matter, a matter of individual choice. They 
were adamant that Turkey must tolerate all religions.
When I pointed out that religious traditions tend to emphasize com-
munal identity over individual identity (particularly characteristic 
of Islam and Judaism), they insisted that in the long run all religion 
belonged in the private domain. When I noted that public and private 
become somewhat blurred, if not altogether dissolved, in a religious 
context, they again asserted that all of these concerns were matters of 
private choice. When Professor Nedelsky asked about the education 
of women and the ban on the headscarf, MP Çelebi asserted that the 
headscarf was a matter of choice, that the ban should be imposed less 
restrictedly, and that women must by all means be educated since, 
after all, they were responsible for raising the children. I did not ask 
about women choosing not to have children or having no choice but 
to work outside the home with children.9 When I asked about social 
programs in response to the massive poverty confronting Turkey as 
it urbanizes ever so quickly, MP Çelebi proposed as solutions funding 
for small businesses, accompanied by tax breaks and the encourage-
ment of foreign investment. I felt as though I were listening to Milton 
Friedman himself. I did not raise the issue of Muslim social teachings, 
which are quite radical in their sense of communal obligation to the 
poor. Perhaps Mr. Çelebi was counting on Muslim charity to fund eco-
nomic relief from the now private domain.
Toward the end of the evening I asked a question that Professor 
Ahmed Samatar, who was also present, had raised over and over 
throughout the seminar. What, I asked, does Islam have to offer a secu-
lar, religiously plural democracy? Çelebi stressed that Islam, properly 
understood, stresses tolerance and peace. He answered, as he was to 
answer later again by e-mail, that Turkish Islam, rooted historically in 
Mevlani mysticism, differs from other forms of Islam in other countries 
in that it developed out of a religiously plural environment that was 
particularly well suited to progressive thought and practice. He went 
on to say that Islam emphasizes teamwork in the form of collective 
brainstorming, which in turn requires listening carefully to everyone’s 
input before making a decision, and making decisions by consensus 
(ijima). I was struck by how such virtues are so anti-individualistic.
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Their mutual suspicions notwithstanding, the commonalities 
between the Çelebis’ views and those of their Kemalist counterparts 
stunned me. With two exceptions, everyone with whom I spoke placed 
great trust in democracy, which was understood as a free-market-
friendly, secular, religiously plural and individualistic polity. They fur-
ther agreed almost universally that entry into the European Union 
would guarantee political and economic stability for Turkey.10 They 
seemed to assume that democracy, understood in relentlessly indi-
vidualistic terms, would by nature produce a stable common good. 
My experience in the United States leads me to believe the contrary. 
Indeed, in my opinion, politics grounded so mercilessly in individual 
choice sounds the death knell to a common good, whether conceived 
in religious or secular terms. To me, both Turkish statism and Turk-
ish Islam appear to be on the block at the moment—potential, if not 
already actual, casualties of global capitalism.
In the process of Turkey’s debate over the place of Islam, as mani-
fested in the contrapuntal relation of the headscarf to the icons of 
Mustafa himself, both Islam and Kemalism have clearly undergone 
modification in relation to each other, even as their boundaries blur. 
The secular state has had to adjust to secular feminist resistance appro-
priated symbolically from Muslim practice and to an Islamist party 
now in power as the majority power, while the Islamists privatize 
Islamic identity to accommodate secularism. Both the debate and the 
mutual modification of Kemalism and Islam reflect the impact of glo-
balization on Turkey, as manifested in the marketing of Muslim chic. 
Given Turkish aspirations to enter the European Union, the debate has 
global implications as well.
*****
Musing
During one of our many seminar discussions Ahmed Samatar asked one of our 
Turkish colleagues, Binnaz Toprak, a professor of political science at Bogazici, 
why she would want Turkey to join the European Union. She replied to the 
effect that the United States had been her second home, that there were many 
people whom she loved as friends and colleagues living there. Then came the 
big “but… . ” She spoke bluntly with sorrow. We now confront a rare histori-
cal moment for seizing a better future for the whole world, a better humanity, 
she claimed. She had given up on the United States that it would seize this 
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moment, a moment of creative self-critique that she associated with the United 
States in the sixties, that she saw now as characteristic of Turkey and, more 
widely, the European Union.
We were speaking in the aftermath of the revelation of the photos of Abu 
Ghraib. Turkey has a long history of human rights abuses that its govern-
ment has more recently sought to remedy, which is a condition for entering 
the European Union. Turkish remedy in the face of U.S. excess strikes me as 
ironic. What can I say? I haven’t given up on the United States yet, though 
despair tempts me daily. I also think Professor Toprak’s view of the European 
Union is somewhat less than sufficiently critical. All the same, for a couple 
of weeks, the images of Abu Ghraib dominate the print and electronic media, 
after which it is back to business as usual, at least in the United States.
The image of the Iraqi man standing, arms outstretched perpendicular to 
his body, legs chained together, head covered, nevertheless continues to haunt 
me, for his torturers have forced him to assume the form of a cross. His body, 
lean and smeared with filth, is tapered perfectly. His physical proportions 
appear near ideal, his image perfectly composed by the camera lens. Whose 
camera? Whose eyes? For whose eyes? Now for mine. It is a pornographic 
image, a precursor to a snuff film, this image of a non-consenting adult who 
takes into his body first our violence, now our gaze. I say our gaze because as 
U.S. citizens we, the people, claim to be the state, and the state set up the con-
ditions for such events in the first place by defying the Geneva Conventions. 
A few U.S. soldiers appear in some of the photos, smiling in some cases. U.S. 
citizens respond with outrage initially, only to go on to other concerns within 
weeks of the “news.” My sister informs me, just before I leave for Istanbul, 
that we need to focus on the good we are doing in Iraq; I can’t seem to move 
on. This non-consenting adult male—perhaps somebody’s lover, surely some-
body’s friend, certainly somebody’s son—lives through this image, humiliated 
for me to see; for me to see, whether I like it or not. Neither he nor I escape the 
gaze, he the object, I the subject’s subject.
Am I “Christianizing” the image of the unknown man by seeing it as a 
crucifixion of sorts? Am I a translator across cultures or just another pornog-
rapher?11 Whatever his values and practices, they are unlikely to be Christian. 
But then Jesus wasn’t a Christian either, when the Roman government cruci-
fied him. I feel caught between the terseness of the gospel account attributed to 
Mark—a mere fourteen verses—and Mel Gibson’s excesses in the film “The 
Passion of the Christ.” Like Michael Moore, I am flat-footed, obnoxious, lack-
ing in subtlety.
As Michael Moore I shove a microphone into President Bush’s face: “Presi-
dent Bush, what would Jesus do? You know, the Jesus nailed up on a cross, his 
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arms outstretched, his body tapered in perfect proportion for two millennia of 
devotees to gaze upon in adoration? Jesus who in his dying took on imperial 
violence deep into his bones, the Jesus who continues to suffer the unrelenting 
human gaze? Where do you see your savior, President Bush, the one whom 
you claim to have died for your sin? Surely not in the faces of the prisoners 
you have murdered at home nor in those, combatant and non-combatant alike, 
killed, tortured and raped under your watch abroad, you, our commander-in-
chief who partied and otherwise slept through the Vietnam war, who is uncom-
fortable reading, who gets anxious in the presence of ideas, who has washed 
his hands of the details—our Lord of the perpetual tabula rasa.”
Though hardly the inventors of torture, we are once again exporting it. 
Bodies piled upon bodies parade across the television screen around the world, 
a performance, an album initially collected to entertain a few of the troops 
away. Why? For mementoes? For Internet pay-per-view? For consumption, 
in any case. Yet without these images we, the people, the state, ironically 
would not know what we have done. What difference this self-knowledge will 
make remains to be seen. Were we to apply for admission to the European 
Union (a dubious fantasy but instructive nevertheless), we would not qualify 
due to our violations of human rights at home and abroad. No wonder Dr. 
Toprak has given up on us.
Analysis
In the not-so-recent past, for any religious adherent, piety and the 
observance of tradition through ritual and ethical practices that shape 
communal and individual identity constituted a way of life involving 
all aspects of behavior and value. This was true for all three monothe-
istic traditions as well as for polytheistic, non-theistic, and shamanistic 
ones. By contrast, for the modern and postmodern secularist, whether 
he or she is religious or not, religion becomes a private matter, essen-
tialized as discrete from economic and political life. In this respect sec-
ularism produces religion. Conceptual distinctions, now reified, reflect 
a legacy of the European Enlightenment in the aftermath of the Wars 
of Religion, one that continues as an intellectual imperialism, paral-
lel to ongoing Western imperial political and economic practices. The 
architects of the nation-state construct “secularism” and “religion” as a 
way of minimizing internal conflict, a way of exercising power within 
the state. In light of globalization, the adherent, like the non-observer, 
now internalizes these conceptual distinctions, adjusting his or her 
traditions accordingly, often undergoing a diminishment of cultural, 
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spiritual, and political life in the process—a colonization of the mind, 
so to speak.12
Regardless of whether secularism takes the form of laïcité or the 
United States Constitution, secularism is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
secularism serves as a space within which religious and political plu-
ralism ostensibly stand protected, at least in theory. The point is to pro-
duce a democratic, religiously and politically plural civil society that 
shares a common good even as it celebrates its differences. In actuality, 
the practices of secularism protect by imposing what my Religious 
Studies colleague Jim Laine has called a “meta-religious” authority, 
designed to police secularity’s ostensible neutrality. This meta-religious 
authority may take the form of statism, itself a quasi-religion, or explic-
itly religious nationalism, depending on whether there is a dominant 
religious tradition to cannibalize in order to insure the authority of the 
state.
In either case, the meta-religious authority of the state has the effect 
of privatizing and decentralizing religious identity and life. The meta-
religious quality of secular authority likewise tends to domesticate any 
politically subversive power characteristic of the dominant tradition it 
cannibalizes, as witnessed by the tension in which the privatization of 
Islam in Turkey stands with codified Muslim social commitments and 
practices. Insofar as secularity emerges out of “Western” culture and is 
imported through the global extension of various forms of capitalism 
(including intellectual capital), secularity has produced wide-ranging 
national and transnational responses that include both enthusiastic 
embrace and adamant resistance and rejection. Turkey represents a 
cultural and geographical location where embrace and resistance meet 
head on, as both Kemalism and Islam renegotiate the terms of their 
relationship.
With the founding of Turkey as a nation-state, Ataturk imposed sec-
ularism by law. He also looked directly to Western Europe for his mod-
els for relations among economic, political, and religious institutions. 
As noted earlier, he consciously crafted the separation of Islam and the 
state on the French model of laïcité, thereby producing Islam in Turkey 
as a discrete religion, subject to state regulation. Turks have internal-
ized this separation, irrespective of whether they are non-observant, 
nominally observant, or deeply observant Muslims, whether Kemalist 
or members of the AKP. The Çelebi family exemplifies this internaliza-
tion.
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If you think this Westernization renders them inauthentic either 
as Muslims or as Turks, however, then you have misunderstood the 
reality of the historical forces at work. It is as authentically Turkish 
to assimilate European values as it is to whirl as a dervish, and the 
assimilation itself changes, generating new forms along the way as 
exemplified by Tekbir, Inc.’s transformation of elite Muslim women’s 
dress. To be a Turk is to engage in a pluralism of lifestyles and practices 
that explode any attempt to set up binaries of Europe and the Middle 
East, West and East, political and religious, non-Muslim and Muslim. 
The “colonized” develop ever new subtle forms of resistance that can 
themselves come to dominate the scene, as when secular women wear 
the headscarf along with their more religiously observant sisters in 
protest against statism. What begins as colonization transmutes into a 
reinvention of the terms of the struggle. Sometimes, though not often 
enough, astonishingly good things may emerge.
Kemalist and AKP member alike hold high hopes for Turkey’s admis-
sion to the European Union, an alliance that both see as an opportunity 
to humanize the planet. The unspoken assumption is that we in the 
United States have relinquished this goal; that the United States is, 
since the fall of the Soviet Union, at the heart of the problem. As skepti-
cal as I am regarding the idea that economic alliances can produce ethi-
cal results (and the European Union is strictly an economic alliance), 
I, too, yearn for a more humane world. I would like to be hopeful too. 
The Turks have, after all, begun prison reform. Maybe we will too.
As an outsider who is by birth part of the problem of the moment, 
I see new formations of both the secular and of Islam in the making, 
without a clue as to how they will finally shake out. What will this 
renegotiation mean for Jews, Greeks, and Armenians still living in Tur-
key, as well as for Muslims of all kinds and the non-observant? What 
will it mean for Kemalist and observant Muslim women alike? What 
role do global technologies play—new and better earthquake detection 
and more earthquake-resistant building materials, for example? How 
will various capitalisms, more and less regulated by the state and by 
international economic alliances, shape and be shaped by these secular 
interactions with the religious? Might Turkey bring to the European 
Union an opportunity to challenge Europe’s own injustices toward 
Muslim immigrants throughout its present constituencies, an opportu-
nity to address its own Christian-centrism, albeit in secularized form? 
To what extent is the controversy surrounding the headscarf at the 
core of it all? Tekbir, Inc. has, after all, expanded its design house 
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throughout Europe and northern Africa. Or is the headscarf merely 
a distraction, a Western ploy to deflect attention from the “West’s” 
own injustice and its role in producing the terrorism on which it has 
declared war?13 Most importantly for me as a U.S. citizen and active 
member of the loyal opposition, is there still time for us to reform, to 
give up the empire, to resign from our role as the heart of the problem? 
These questions continue to nag. I will take them into classroom dis-
cussion. Already during the seminar I have phoned home new titles to 
be added to the book-order lists for the fall.
*****
Musing
The Haggia Sophia or Ayasofia (depending on one’s preference for ancient or 
modern Greek)—made from the ruins of pagan temples, built on the site of a 
temple to Athena in Byzantium, burnt to the ground and rebuilt by architects 
Isidoros of Mellitus and Anthemios of Tralles in 537 CE in Constantinople, 
converted into a mosque with the Ottoman conquest and Constantinople’s 
renaming as Istanbul, now transformed by secularists of the twentieth century 
into a museum—is hardly just another building. The Roman Emperor, Chris-
tian by 537 CE, had his own private entrance where, upon entering with his 
wife, he would remove his armor. While the empress made her way to her own 
balcony, he, joined by the patriarchate, entered the sanctuary. No separation 
of religion and state here. Muslims later painted over the mosaics depicting 
Jesus’ life and hung huge calligraphies in tribute to Allah and Muhammad. 
They left the fish and the crosses because they were not human figurations. 
Much to my secularized Protestant surprise, I experience a fleeting moment 
of offense that they would cover the face of Christ. Where did that feeling come 
from? Meanwhile, the secularists have set about to restore the mosaics to their 
original condition. Images of Mary Theotokos (the Mother of God), holding 
the baby Jesus in her arms, particularly abound.
We begin the day at the St. Savior of Chorea Church, move on to the Sulei-
man Mosque (Suleymaniye Camii), then to Ayasofia and the Blue Mosque. 
The Blue Mosque stands across the street from Ayasofia, dwarfing it to some 
extent, a tribute to the talent of its architect Mehmet Aga, who completed it in 
1616. Absent any human representation, the interior is tiled in blue from floor 
to the tip-top of the dome—austere and grand. It is a working mosque; people 
enter and pray. I enter without shoes, head covered out of respect. Both build-
ings dwarf the ego and force the gaze upwards. Our tour ends ironically at 
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the Grand Bazaar. The sound of the guide’s voice transforms circles, squares, 
and triangles into four dimensions, as hawkers of wares mark every site by 
the buying and selling of beautiful things, regardless of prohibitions against 
idolatry.
What does it mean to go, look, listen, wander about, and buy? To remove 
my shoes and don the headscarf, yet without performing ablutions or prayers? 
I promise myself that someday l will write an article titled “When Religious 
Site Becomes Theme Park, How Do We Tell the Scholars from the Tourists?”
But I am distracted; our guide is giving us history, here, now. Whose his-
tory? God’s? I am losing all sense of personal possessive pronouns, all sense 
of “here,” “there,” and “when.” I have undergone the temporary dissolution 
of time and space before, the loss of “me” and “mine.” But now “ours” and 
“theirs”—whole families, tribes, communities, groups, nations—blur. NOT 
into a single universal “one.” Rather, particularities pile one upon another in 
a jumble, their borders fuzzing yet remaining, huddling, shimmering without 
end. It is the near-death of each and every distinctiveness blurring into the 
birth of another—not some final, complete whole, but a never-ending rhythm 
or series of rhythms, wound around one another, pulsating in the muezzin’s 
call, the cargo ship’s blaring horn, the rare but occasional church bell, the 
music of flute, accordion, and Sinatra. We return to our rooms. The rich, 
various sounds along the Bosphorus haunt my memory, even as the view con-
tinues to dazzle my imagination. I write furiously, striving to capture every 
moment—my own particular practice of idolatry.
I hear laughter outside my window. It’s time for a drink with friends. •
Notes
1. I am extremely grateful for the help of Fatma Muge Gocek, Professor of Sociology 
at the University of Michigan; Khaldoun Samman, Assistant Professor of Sociology at 
Macalester College; Nadya Nedelsky, Assistant Professor of International Studies at 
Macalester; and Anne Seasholes-Kozlu, Macalester alumna, for their aide in my research. 
Fatma recommended Islamist scholars and gave me e-mail addresses to pursue; she also 
suggested excellent readings. Khaldoun, who plays a mean drum, put me onto impor-
tant texts as well. Nadya, with whom I had overlapping research interests, developed 
most of the initial questions for our interview with the Çelebi family (not their real 
name) and took off on adventures into the unknown at the drop of a hat as together we 
sought Islamist women to interview, though without success. Anne set up the interview 
with the Çelebis and steered us through it with uncommon generosity, hospitality, and 
grace.
2. I am, after all, a scholar, by definition both an iconoclast and an idolater of sorts.
3. For purposes of this discussion secular, as manifested in the context of the modern 
nation-state, refers to ostensibly religiously neutral space governed by laws that, while 
they often originate in religious traditions and practices, now owe no allegiance to their 
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historical origins. A state governed by secular law may or may not accommodate histori-
cal religious traditions and practices, at the state’s disposal. Religion in the modern era 
has come to refer to a private spiritual domain, governed by transcendent realities, and 
organized around discrete teachings and practices that generate individual and com-
munal identities apart from political considerations. For the modern nation-state, secu-
larism and religion expand and contract in the content of their respective definitions in 
relation to one another. The more narrowly religion is defined and the more privatized 
and spiritualized, the more religious functions the state takes on. Functions that usually 
represent faded forms of the religious tradition dominate within the state. My point here 
is to interrogate such definitions.
4. Muslims do not universally agree that Muslim law requires covering women, nor do 
those who practice covering agree on what “covering” means.
5. Women have transcended the religious-secular divide on other important issues as 
well, chief among them, the issue of domestic violence.
6. See Yael Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 94–107.
7. Ibid., pp. 85–94.
8. In keeping with the academic practice of confidentiality for informants, Çelebi is a fic-
titious name. Because all others in this essay spoke as scholars in public contexts, I have 
used their real names.
9. See Jenny B. White’s Money Makes Us Relatives: Women’s Labor in Urban Turkey (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1994).
10. In our seminar presentations and discussions, Professor Mine Eder, a political sci-
entist of economics from Bogazici, and Huseyin Erkan, Executive Vice Chairman of the 
Turkish Stock Exchange, expressed reservations about the potentially negative economic 
effects of entry into the European Union, particularly for rural areas. Eder also briefly 
addressed the problems of thoroughgoing individualism. Eder added that she was often 
accused of disloyally representing Turkey when she was critical on such matters.
11. By translator, I mean someone who seeks to carry something really important from 
one context to another in ways that honor both contexts, the action of which produces 
something new that will serve a wider good. See Milner S. Ball, “Common Good in Per-
formance,” unpublished manuscript.
12. For the development of these very briefly stated claims, see Talal Asad’s Genealogies of 
Religion: Disciplines and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1993) and Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity 
(Stanford, Conn.: Stanford University Press, 2003).
13. A European Court of Human Rights judgment recently held that the human rights of 
Leyla Sahin, a fifth-year medical student at the University of Istanbul, were not violated 
when she was denied access to a written examination and enrollment to a course for 
her refusal to remove a headscarf. In addition, she was suspended from the university 
for a term for participating in an unauthorized protest against the ban, although all 
disciplinary penalties had been revoked under a general amnesty. The Court found that 
the ban, though a state interference in religious life, protected the rights and freedoms 
of others according to the principles of secularism and equality. The Court found that 
under Turkish law, “secularism in Turkey was, among other things the guarantor of 
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democratic values; the principle that religious freedom was inviolable, to the extent that 
it stemmed from individual conscience; and, the principle that citizens were equal before 
the law. Restrictions could be placed on freedom to manifest one’s religion in order to 
defend those values and principles… . [T]he Court considered that, when examining the 
question of the Islamic headscarf in the Turkish context, there had to be borne in mind 
the impact of wearing such a symbol” on others and on public order, given the political 
significance of this religious symbol in recent years. “It was the principle of secularism 
which was the paramount consideration.” Excerpted from Chamber Judgments in the 
Cases of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey and Zynep Tekin v. Turkey, a press release issued by the reg-
istrar and posted at http: www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2004/June/ChamberjudgmentsSa. 
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